The prevalence of dementia is increasing with the ever-growing population of older adults. Non-pharmacological, music-based interventions, including sensory stimulation, were reported by the Lancet Commission in 2020 to be the first-choice approach for managing the behavioural and psychological symptoms of dementia. Low frequency sinusoidal vibration interventions, related to music interventions through their core characteristics, may offer relief for these symptoms. Despite increasing attention on the effectiveness of auditory music interventions and music therapy for managing dementia, this has not included low (...) frequency vibration. This scoping review, following the JBI methodology guidelines, was conducted to investigate participants’ responses to both sound and mechanical vibration, the characteristics of the delivered interventions, methodological challenges, and the specifics of the research experiments reported. An extensive search was conducted in BMC, CINAHL, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, EMBASE, ERIC, MEDLINE, Pedro, ProQuest Central, PsycINFO, Scopus, and Web of Science. Current Controlled Trials, Clinical Trials, and Google Scholar were also searched as well as a hand search in relevant journals. Studies on adults with all types of dementia, investigating tactile low frequency sound or mechanical vibration in any context were considered. Data from eight full-length studies were extracted using the data extraction table developed by the authors and were included in the analysis and critical appraisal. Issues in quality related to, for example, control groups and blinding. Few studies addressed participants’ subjective responses to the interventions. Reporting on the intervention characteristics was unclear. It appeared more frequent sessions led to better outcomes and home-based interventions potentially addressing the issue of access and feasibility. Future research should include neuroimaging to measure and confirm the hypothesised mechanism of cerebral coherence. Standardised reporting of intervention characteristics is also needed to ensure replicability of the experiments. Higher quality research is needed to investigate the impact and effect of low frequency vibration for the symptoms of dementia and compare outcomes in meta-syntheses. (shrink)

Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as En lighten ment is the first book in the English language that seeks to place Carnap's philosophy in a broad cultural, political and intellectual context. According to the author, Carnap synthesized many different cur rents of thought and thereby arrived at a novel philosophical perspective that remains strik ing ly relevant today. Whether the reader agrees with Carus's bold theses on Carnap's place in the landscape of twentieth-century philosophy, and his even bolder claims (...) concerning the role that philosophy in Carnap's style should play in the thought of our century, does not matter so much as the excellent opportunity Carus's book offers to thoroughly rethink one's ideas about Carnap's philosophy. One reason why Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought might change one's ideas is that Carus has unearthed much hitherto unknown material from the archives that sheds new light on Carnap's early life and thought. Indeed, the many archival findings presented in CTT for the first time suffice to make the book re warding reading for philosophers and historians of philosophy alike. CTT exhibits a high standard of historical scholarship, and the book itself is a beautiful example of high-quality academic publishing. Up to now, Carnap has remained a controversial figure on the philo sophical scene. On the one hand, he has a solid reputation as a leading figure of logical positivism . According to conventional wisdom, this was a school of thought characterized by its formal and technical philosophy, as well as being rather dismissive of other ways of doing philosophy, dogmatically sticking to its own theses. As a typical example of this arrogant logical empiricist attitude, one usually refers to Carnap's notorious Overcoming Metaphysics by Logical Analysis of Language , written when the Vienna Circle's Logical Empiricism had entered its most radical phase. Self-proclaimed postpositivist philosophers of science dismissed logical positivism, in particular Carnap's, as the dogmatic and orthodox “received view.” The tendency to portray logical empiricism as an obsolete doctrine centering around certain “dogmas” started with Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism and reached its somewhat ridiculous culmination in the early 1980s when allegedly “six or seven dogmas” were discovered . Thereby an allegedly un brid geable gap between classical “dogmatic” logical em pi ricism and its modern “enlightened” suc ces sors was construed. (shrink)

For courses in Business Ethics A fresh approach to the assumptions that underlie business practices Two recent events — the 2008 economic meltdown and the ongoing concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of a very small percentage of the population — have led many people to question a number of basic assumptions about business, corporations, and the workings of contemporary free-market capitalism in a global economy. Written as a dialogue between Socrates and a hypothetical contemporary CEO,Socrates Comes to (...) Wall Street leads students to think critically about perspectives and practices that are taken as “givens” in most American business schools and corporations. Employing this original and provocative approach, author Thomas White seeks to encourage the next generation of business leaders to be more astute about the implications of their actions, and to act more prudently and more fairly than we have seen in the recent past. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Incomprehensible Certainty: Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Image by Thomas PfauThomas ZingelmannPFAU, Thomas. Incomprehensible Certainty: Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Image. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022. xxiii + 785 pp. Cloth, $80.00Thomas Pfau reconstructs one of the most traditional and possibly most decisive philosophical debates, [End Page 559] namely, the one about the form and function of appearance (Schein). This debate is (...) taken up on the basis of the concept of image. This means that Pfau concentrates historically as well as systematically on a specific topic within this debate. The book is divided into two major sections.In the first section, Pfau examines how the history of the metaphysics and theology of the image develops, starting with Plato in the first chapter. The basic idea in this section is that the image has a crucial epistemic role in the metaphysical and theological systems of the authors addressed. Here Pfau shows that Plato, at the latest in the Sophist, develops a theory of images that revalues appearance contrary to the assumptions in the Republic. Chapter 1 is about the mediation of unity and multiplicity, as it is also shown in Plotinus. Chapter 2 attempts to show how the Byzantine icon embodies the conviction that the invisible truth of the visual world can be revealed only through images. Pfau's demonstration of various epistemic dimensions of the image then begins with chapter 3: the eschatological vision from Augustine to Bonaventure to Julian of Norwich. Chapter 4, the last of the first section, reconstructs Nicholas of Cusa's position, which attempts to understand mystical visions mediated by images of Christ.The second section examines how the metaphysics of the image—in the sense of an epistemology, which tries to establish ultimate justifications—nevertheless persists and even evolves despite two crucial switches in philosophy. On the one hand, this concerns philosophy that subordinates the visual to the abstract (for example, Hegel) and, on the other, the supposedly nonmetaphysical status of the image in the developing natural sciences. Chapter 5 then attempts to show, through Goethe's botanical investigations and reflections, how, despite the establishment of the natural sciences, Goethe attempts to defend intuition as a scientific method and appearance as a scientific object of investigation. This position is then pursued historically in chapter 6, through the work of Lyell, Darwin, and Ruskin, where the visible is understood as the connecting point of the sciences in general. Gerard Manley Hopkins is then identified in chapter 7 as representing a position that combines theological with proto-phenomenological arguments to highlight the epistemic value of images. The last chapter then deals with decisive developments at the beginning of the twentieth century. In phenomenology (Husserl), painting (Cézanne), and poetry (Rilke), a conception develops that epistemically valorizes sensual and intuitive experience.Generally speaking, Pfau attempts to trace historically what arguments and positions have been developed on the relationship between image and knowledge. His work is based on the conviction that the image is the basis for human orientation in the world and is therefore of great epistemological value. Of outstanding importance for his question is that the epistemological value of images is not to be located in the properties of images, that is, an ontology of the image; rather, Pfau is interested in those positions that reflect on the relationship between knowledge and [End Page 560] experience of images. While clarifying the ontological status of images remains important, the epistemological status of images—what role the experience and usage of images has for humans—is in the foreground. Pfau reconstructs positions that hold that the pictorial is a medium of knowledge. He puts forward the thesis that there is a tradition that is of the opinion that in and through the medium of the image—and this closes the arc to the Schein-debate—being can be experienced by man. In other words, the invisible is to become recognizable through the visible. Of particular importance is his reading of the late Platonic dialogues: While appearance and being are still thought of as distinct in these dialogues, they are not opposed, in the sense of an epistemic opposition. Plato's... (shrink)

In this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate. In contrast, I will defend (...) an evidence-linked account of expertise. In the second part of the chapter, I address the question of how laypeople can identify experts in this sense. Here, I will argue that agreement among experts plays a major role. I will outline how laypeople can follow this criterion without running into circularity. (shrink)

Recently, Barbara Renzi argued that Kuhn's account of scientific change is undermined by mismatches in the analogy that Kuhn supposedly draws between scientific change and biological evolution. We argue that Renzi's criticism is inadequate to Kuhn's account of scientific change, as Kuhn does not draw any precise analogy between the mechanisms of scientific change and biological evolution nor aims to argue that the mechanisms of scientific change and biological evolution are similar in any important respects. Therefore, pointing to mismatches between (...) the central concepts that feature in the descriptions of the two phenomena simply misses the point of Kuhn's analogy. *Received January 2010; revised January 2010. †To contact the authors, please write to: Thomas A. C. Reydon, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Im Moore 21, D‐30167 Hannover, Germany; e‐mail: [email protected]‐hannover.de. (shrink)

On the one hand they seem to be quite obviously truth conditionally equivalent, but on the other hand they seem to be about different things. Whereas (1) is about Jupiter and its moons, (2) is about numbers. In particular, the word ‘four’ appears in (1) in the position of an adjective or determiner, whereas it seems to be a name for a number in (2). Furthermore, (2) appears to be an identity statement claiming that what two number terms (...) stand for is the same thing. Several authors have proposed answers to this puzzle, including Frege, by either pinning the issue on the nature of numbers, pretense, fictionalism, or the nature of reference, but all these proposals agreed that (2) is an identity statement and that in it ‘four’ is a name for an object. In [Hofweber, 2007] I argued that (2) is not an identity statement and that ‘four’ in (2) is not a name for an object. The argument for it was this: When we look at what role (2) has in actual communication we can see that (2) has a focus effect on a discourse that arises from the syntax without special intonation. (shrink)

The standard account in whistleblowing research fixes the birth of the whistleblowing concept in the early 1970s. Surprisingly, there are no efforts to discuss why whistleblowing emerged as a distinct new action repertoire at this particular moment in time. Whistleblowing is a historical latecomer to an ethos of field transgression, which includes well-established forms of intervention such as watchdog journalism and political activism. Whistleblowing has strong affinities with these practices, but also holds its own unique place in ethics and democracy. (...) We can only appreciate these qualities in full if we trace the historical origins of the concept. The article argues that the concept of whistleblowing crystallized at the intersection of a set of trends that picked up speed in the 1960s–1970s: individualization, changing perceptions of loyalty, declines in authority trust, new participation patterns, and a growing awareness of the dangers and complexities in human production and organization. This is not simply an exercise in disciplinary history. Whistleblowing is on the rise in these years, just as digitalization creates a whole new range of opportunities for disclosure. It takes an increasingly steady hand to isolate the distinct ethical-democratic contribution of whistleblowers within this complex reality. To achieve this, we need to be able to place whistleblowing on a broader sociological and historical map. (shrink)

To understand Hobbes’s handling of Christian scripture in Part 3 of Leviathan we need to see it in the light of his own radical account of the norms controlling public religious speech and practice as set out in Part 2 and in other works such as De Cive and De Corpore. As these texts make clear, Hobbes holds that we ought rationally to venerate the first cause of all, and that the proper way to venerate this awesome and incomprehensible being (...) is to publicly adopt the local culture’s religious practices, however arbitrary or conventional those practices might be. For the seventeenth-century English subject, the Anglo-Protestant scriptural religion provides the appropriate vehicle to express this rationally mandated religious piety, and thus provides a form of devotion that Hobbes embraces in a spirit of genuine religious reverence. At the same time, he also regards this religion, like all scriptural religions, as a conventional human artifact that, given the ear of the sovereign, he might hope to shape in favor of Hobbesian ideals such as civil obedience, the separation of philosophy from religion, and the extirpation of belief in an immaterial spirit-world. The proposed interpretation dissolves systematic problems facing irreligious readings on the one hand, and more straightforwardly Christian readings on the other. (shrink)

Thomas Eisele explores the premise that the Socratic method of inquiry need not teach only negative lessons. Instead, Eisele contends, the Socratic method is cyclical: we start negatively by recognizing our illusions, but end positively through a process of recollection performed in response to our disillusionment, which ultimately leads to renewal. Thus, a positive lesson about our resources as philosophical investigators, as students and teachers, becomes available to participants in Socrates' robust conversational inquiry. __Bitter Knowledge __includes Eisele's detailed readings (...) of Socrates' teaching techniques in three fundamental Platonic dialogues, _Protagoras, Meno_, and _Theaetetus_, as well as his engagement with contemporary authorities such as Gregory Vlastos, Martha Nussbaum, and Stanley Cavell. Written in a highly engaging and accessible style, this book will appeal to students and scholars in philosophy, classics, law, rhetoric, and education. "This book is original, fresh, and of very high quality, opening up these Platonic texts, central to Western culture, in new ways. In addition, it establishes a method that others can use and apply to the other dialogues. It would be a wonderful text to assign in courses in philosophy, basic humanities, education, and law." --_James Boyd White, University of Michigan_ "Through his thoughtful and incisive readings of Plato, Thomas Eisele puts Socrates in a new light. In Eisele's hands, Socrates offers us a method not simply for philosophy but for the challenges of life and mind. This superb book builds on the great readings of Plato, adding to the richness of our understanding of the enigmatic figure of Socrates. These are profound readings of Plato." --_Dennis Patterson, Rutgers University School of Law_ "Eisele's book is much more than an erudite, seductive, and imaginative exploration of three central Platonic dialogues. It is also a fine general treatment of philosophy, discussing the kind of finality or closure to which philosophical questions are susceptible and the appropriate stance of the inquirer. It considers the pedagogy of philosophy and law brilliantly." --_Thomas Morawetz, University of Connecticut School of Law_. (shrink)

As frequently pointed out in this discussion, one of the most characteristic features of Mayr's approach to the history of biology stems from the fact that he is dealing to a considerable degree with his own professional history. Furthermore, his main criterion for the selection of historical episodes is their relevance for modern biological theory. As W. F. Bynum and others have noted, the general impression of his reviewers is that “one of the towering figures of evolutionary biology has now (...) written a towering history of his discipline.”138 Bynum is here referring to The Growth of Biological Thought, but this observation holds equally true for Mayr's other historical writings: One must surely read this book [One Long Argument] not only for its content in itself, but for what it tells of its author. And certainly as one does so, one comes away full-handed. Many, if not all, of the disputes and controversies that have driven Mayr through his long intellectual life reappear, stated as forcefully and elegantly as ever.139Up to this point, most reviewers agree; the bone of contention is, rather, how to evaluate Mayr's historical work, considering this observation. The two related characteristics of his work-I will call them subjectivity and presentism-stand in opposition to a widespread approach in the history of science exemplified by Kuhn's suggestion that “insofar as possible..., the historian should set aside the science that he knows. His science should be learned from the textbooks and journals of the period he studies.”140 There are, however, historians who consider the close connection between Mayr and the subject matter of his historical studies to be an advantage.141On the other hand, it is assumed that the connection between past and present must result in a distortion of the historical truth and lead to a historiographical fallacy, commonly referred to as “Whig history”. Herbert Butterfield, who in 1931 gave the term its now generally accepted meaning, believed that “real historical understanding is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own”142. Unfortunately, Butterfield's definition of what he considers Whig history remains somewhat vague, and modern authors have emphasized what they consider most important. Butterfield's “subordination of the past to the present” is referred to in respect to the selection of subjects (there are more biographies of Charles Darwin than of, let's say, Louis Agassiz),143 to the evaluation of historical authors,144 or, more generally, to all kinds of histories “with one eye, so to speak, upon the present.”145 The underlying tendency of Whig historians is to produce a “historical account told from the viewpoint of those in power,”146 leading to a “glorification of the present.”147 It is obvious that Mayr's strongly presentist approach to the history of biology can be called Whiggish, if we apply the criteria of “selection” or “reference.” However, it might be worth mentioning that the program of writing a strictly historicist account of the history of science is challenged by various authors.148 For Mayr, it is not only legitimate but necessary to compare the present situation with the past. “Whiggish” is only the evaluation of an author in terms of our time.149I cannot discuss the Whit/anti-Whig controversy in any detail here, apart from saying that Mayr has defended himself rather extensively against the charges of being Whiggish.150 Nevertheless, it may be useful to touch on some of the criticisms that are predominant in reviews of his writings. First, we encounter the notion that historians can write a true and convincing historical account only if they have no personal interest or interpretation of their own; Mayr, on the other hand, because he “has such strong interpretations of his own, ... cannot possibly convince everyone that he is right about everything.”151 It makes one wonder, what historian has ever been able to convince everyone that he or she is right about everything? But apart from this peculiar idea, it unquestionably poses certain dangers if the subject matter of historical scrutiny and the author are identical. At the same time, this identity brings certain advantages with it, especially firsthand experiences of the period in discussion. Whether these personal memories ultimately result in a distorted picture of the past has to be decided in every particular instance. The notion that a scientific study can be conducted by a completely detached observer from a neutral standpoint has been shown to be impossible in physics, and it is also an illusion in historiography. The question is not whether, but which kind of interest are the underlying motivation for a historian. At this point, Mayr is ahead of his critics when he suggests that our understanding of the past always has a subjective component: The main reason, however, why histories are in constant need of revision is that at any given time they merely reflect the present state of understanding; they depend on how the author interpreted the current zeitgeist of biology and on his own conceptual framework and background. Thus, by necessity the writing of history is subjective and ephemeral.152Second, the temporal proximity between the event and the historical analysis makes difficulties inevitable and will finally result in certain false assessments. But this applies to all historians when they discuss recent problems, regardless of whether they are personally involved or not: As long as the battle between Darwinism and Lamarckism was raging, it was quite impossible to undertake an unbiased evaluation of Lamarck. ...[The] definite refutation of Lamarck's theory of evolutionary causation clears the air. We can now study him without bias and emotion and give him the attention that this major figure in the history of biology clearly deserves.153Third, Mayr is primarily interested in biological problems and not, for instance, historiographical, sociological, or psychological questions. Several authors have remarked that since the beginning of the professionalization of the history of science in the 1960s, a rift between two groups has developed, resulting from the heterogeneous professional backgrounds and interests of the people involved: the authors who were originally biologists and became interested in the history of their discipline only later on, and the authors who were trained as historians.154 Whereas the first group, the “biologists,” tend to be laymen in history proper, the “historians” are in most cases laymen in biology. Different professional backgrounds obviously shape the historical perspective in both groups, but neither approach is necessarily superior. The great number of important books in the history of biology written by “biologist” documents how valuable this point of view can be. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the writings of biologists in the history of science tend to have a strong “internalist” tendency and often neglect the professional, cultural, and political context of science. Mayr's approach is that of a “biologist”; it is “internalist,” and typical for scientists who turn to the history of their discipline.I want to conclude my analysis with a quotation from a review by Douglas J. Futuyma, which gives a perceptive glimpse of Mayr's personality and style: One cannot help standing in awe of the germanic capacity for vast, allembracing synthesis: consider the lifelong devotion of Goethe to Faust, or Wagner's integration of the arts into a Gesamtkunstwerk in which all of human history and experience is wrought into epic myth. It is perhaps in this tradition that Ernst Mayr's The Growth of Biological Thought stands: a history of all of biology, a Ring des Nibelungen complete with leitmotivs such as the failures of reductionism, the struggle of biology for independence from physics, and the liberation of population thinking from the bounds of essentialism.155 Within this style of thinking Mayr has “to offer...nothing less than a vision of biology that places neodarwinian evolutionary theory firmly at the centre.”156 There may be other visions of biology, but few of them have as indefatigable and able representatives as Darwinism has in Ernst Mayr. (shrink)

Kantian constructivists accord a constitutive, justificatory role to the issue of scope: they typically claim that first-order practical thought depends for its authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope, or by all relevant others, and some Kantian constructivists, notably Onora O'Neill, hold that our views of the nature and criteria of practical reasoning also depend for their authority on being suitably acceptable within the right scope. The paper considers whether O'Neill-type Kantian constructivism can coherently accord this key role (...) to the issue of scope while adhering to the universalist, ‘cosmopolitan’ commitments at its core. The paper argues that this is not so. On the one hand, it shows that O'Neill's attempt to ‘fix’ the scope of practical reasoning supposes, rather than establishes, a view of ethical standing and the scope of practical reasoning. On the other hand, the paper argues that Kantian constructivism should endorse a non-constructivist, perfectionist view of the good to determine that scope. The paper thereby supports the perfectionist conjecture that Kantian constructivism, in order to defend its universalist commitments, should take refuge in non-constructivist, perfectionist considerations, and that Kantian constructivism should therefore construe perfectionism as a partial, though uneasy, ally. (shrink)

There is no arguing the impact of Inoue Tetsujirō on the development of philosophy in Japan from the Meiji Restoration through the end of the Pacific War. He was the first Japanese to receive a doctorate in philosophy from Germany and the first native-born chair of the philosophy department at Tokyo Imperial University, the training center for almost all the major Japanese philosophers who graduated before 1915. Inoue was instrumental in making German idealism the Western philosophy of choice for Japan, (...) but he also appreciated Asian traditions as well, having no qualms about claiming there was true philosophy in India, China, and premodern Japan. He set the foundation for academic philosophy in Japan not so much through his own rather simplistic personal philosophy, but especially through his contributions to the organization of the field. This article focuses mainly on Inoue’s troubled relation with Confucianism. On one hand, in seeking a premodern philosophy to serve as the bedrock for modern Japan, Inoue looked to the Edo-period Confucian traditions originating in China. He divided them into Shushigaku, Yōmeigaku, and what he named Kogaku, the school focusing on classical texts preceding neo-Confucian developments and interpretations. In many respects, like so many others of his generation, Inoue was by training and personal preference a Confucian. That is not the whole story, however. Inoue understood Confucianism’s primary purpose as cultivating the social values and order that would ensure an efficient society of human flourishing, stability, and harmony. Yet, he also likely suspected that the people of the new Japan, with its modernization and plethora of Western ideas, would not unquestioningly accept the authority of the Confucian classics, nor be willing to undertake the rigors of textual study that are the hallmark of the Confucian scholar. In Edo-period Japan, that study had been the responsibility of the samurai class, but in their democratization program, the Meiji reformers had abolished the old class system. Education of the young would now shift from the Confucian academies to the new public school system. Always cooperative with the government to the point of being obsequious, Inoue took a leading role in the National Morality program and its installment in the nationwide school curriculum. That curriculum combined a Shinto-based reverence for the sacred nature of the emperor in the kokutai ideology along with practical moralistic values that could be loosely called Confucian. Yet, if schooling for most was limited to the elementary level and if there was no longer a samurai class to oversee the moral behavior of the society, who could nurture and enforce the moral order? Through a set of fortuitous events, Inoue “discovered” bushidō, the Way of the warrior. If there were no longer a samurai warrior class, perhaps all Japanese could become de facto samurai—at least in their mindset. Most may no longer have the scholarly skills and time to glean their spiritual and moral insights from Confucian texts. Yet, they could find the virtues of loyalty, sincerity, filiality, and compliance with seniority within the distinctively mindful heart and spirit of ancient Japan carried within the Japanese bloodline. What happened to the Confucianism of Inoue Tetsujirō? Some of its values were absorbed into bushidō and National Morality, but the praxis of the Confucian scholar and the ideal of the kunshi seem to have been lost, much to Japan’s detriment. (shrink)

We question the free energy principle (FEP) as it is used in contemporary physics. If the FEP is incorrect in physics, then it cannot ground the authors' arguments. We also question the assumption that perception requires inference. We argue that perception (including perception of social affordances) can be direct, in which case inference is not required.

Beginning in the Southern Sung, one Confucian sect gradually came to dominate literati culture and, by the Ming dynasty, was canonized as state orthodoxy. This book is a historical and textual critique of the process by which claims to exclusive possession of the truth came to serve power. The author analyzes the formation of the Confucian canon and its role in the civil service examinations, the enshrinement of worthies in the Confucian temple, and the emergence of the Confucian anthology, (...) activities that canonized one conception of the Confucian tradition as orthodox by selecting among persons who shaped the tradition. This lineage became 'the genealogy of the way'. The author draws on contemporary cultural and literary theory to help situate Confucian anthologies in ritual, institutional, sectarian, and ideological contexts. (shrink)

There is a fault-line in the philosophy of the New Right, running along the theme of force and violence. On the one hand, New Right politicians advocate the right to autarchic self-defense. On the other hand, they call for more authority for police and other groups to which force is delegated.By analysing this fault-line conceptually, it is possible to get to the heart of a dichotomy in the democratic state. This dichotomy goes back to the earliest democratic conceptions (...) in Athens, and Aristotle’s Politics helps to illustrate the dialectic of the concepts which constitute the logic of self-reflexivity.With this analysis in hand, it is possible to revisit the theatrical crux of democracy, and its basis in the possibility of an open theatre of contestation. (shrink)

Our technologies are progressively developing into algorithmic devices that seamlessly interface with digital personhood. This text discusses the ways in which technology is increasingly becoming a part of personhood and the resulting ethical issues. It extends upon the framework for a brain-based cyberpsychology outlined by the author's earlier book Cyberpsychology and the Brain: The Interaction of Neuroscience and Affective Computing. Using this framework, Thomas D. Parsons investigates the ethical issues involved in cyberpsychology research and praxes, which emerge in (...) algorithmically coupled people and technologies. The ethical implications of these ideas are important as we consider the cognitive enhancements that can be afforded by our technologies. If people are intimately linked to their technologies, then removing or damaging the technology could be tantamount to a personal attack. On the other hand, algorithmic devices may threaten autonomy and privacy. This book reviews these and other issues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas G. Pavel INCOMPLETE WORLDS, RITUAL EMOTIONS' IN recent years, the notion of "fictional world" has enjoyed a considerable rise in fortune. The expression, however, is not entirely new. To refer to the world of a literary work, of a novel or of a play, has always been a favorite way of speaking for literary critics and aestheticians. In most cases, these were informal worlds. A discussion of (...) the world of Balzac, Dostoyevsky, HenryJames, or Proust often amounts to a description of each author's preferences in die selection and rearrangement of his material. Such discussion primarily fits authors who purposefully attempt to build comprehensive representational artifacts. One speaks quite naturally about l'univers balzacien, or about the universe of Musil. But is one entitled to refer with equal ease to the world ofBenjamin Constant, meagerly perceptible in his Adolphe, a short novel built in the spirit of economy, displaying just a few characters and a minimum of worldly information? Perhaps density and comprehensiveness are not indispensable characteristics of literary worlds. Aestheticians and narratologists using the "fictional worlds" terminology seem to believe mat any kind of artistic text projects a world, be it rich or poor. Such worlds are imagined in the fashion of modern philosophy of logic as states of affairs, more or less comprehensive. Some writers believe that the states of affairs comprised in fictional worlds must be fairly sizable, since diey should include "not only what the author indicates, but also whatever is required (entailed) by that which he indicates." 1 The laws of nature which are not specifically contradicted by the text would belong to its world. Thus, a few notorious cases aside, there is no reason to doubt that every child born in fiction has been engendered by a human fadier as long as the text does not report an exception. And if it does? Then, assuming that the laws of logic still govern if not fiction itself at least our understanding of it, we may appeal to what "possible world" philosophers have called "small miracles." * Editor's note: This article, as well as the contributions by Gerald Prince, Peter van Inwagen, and Kendall Walton which follow it, grew out ofa symposium on "Styles ofFictionality," organized by Professor Pavel and held at Harvard University in 1981. The Fall, 1983 issue of PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE will contain additional papers presented at the symposium. 48 Thomas G. Pavel49 Imagine, for instance, the world in which Notre Dame de Paris would be covered with blue paint. While everything else would preserve the properties it possesses in the actual world, with the laws of nature and the caused chains maintained, a small local change, somewhat miraculous, would modify only the color of the venerable building. Similarly, the world of Balzac may be understood as the world of early and mid-nineteenth-century France, slightly modified by the addition of a few hundred imagined characters. That diese conform surprisingly well to the general laws of French society of the time is so much the goal of Balzac's successful project, that for the sociologically-minded reader die' actual nonexistence of Rastignac, Rubempré, Vautrin, or Birotteau may appear a mere accident. These characters, one may surmise, display every trait that actual counterparts of theirs would possess, except existence. Hence, why would Rastignac's or Vautrin's emergence in a world omerwise identical to nineteenth-century France amount to anydiing more than a "small miracle"? On the other hand, Balzac's world being blessed wim hundreds of such miracles, the very magnitude of the project vindicates the attribute of "visionary," ascribed to Balzac by Béguin, or, if metaphorically undercut, mat of"God the Father" given him by Thibaudet. For, would not such magnitude entail more than just local changes in an otherwise faithful representation of the "actual" nineteenthcentury France? Similarly, would we interpret a fictional world in which a child has been engendered not by a human father, but by a divinity, as identical in all respects to the actual world, except for the limited modification attributed to a small miracle? 2 If we grant for a moment the improbable assumption that nineteenth-century France was a given and that Balzac... (shrink)

Current work in experimental biology revolves around a handful of animal species. Studying only a few organisms limits science to the answers that those organisms can provide. Nature has given us an overwhelming diversity of animals to study, and recent technological advances have greatly accelerated the ability to generate genetic and genomic tools to develop model organisms for research on host–microbe interactions. With the help of such models the authors therefore hope to construct a more complete picture of the mechanisms (...) that underlie crucial interactions in a given metaorganism (entity consisting of a eukaryotic host with all its associated microbial partners). As reviewed here, new knowledge of the diversity of host–microbe interactions found across the animal kingdom will provide new insights into how animals develop, evolve, and succumb to the disease. (shrink)

Admiration is thought to have essential functions for social interaction: it inspires us to learn from excellent models, to become better people, and to praise others and create social bonds. In intergroup relations, admiration for other groups leads to greater intergroup contact, cooperation, and help. Given these implications, it is surprising that admiration has only been researched by a handful of authors. In this article we review the literature, focusing on the definition of admiration, links to related emotions, measurement, antecedents, (...) and associated behaviors. We propose a conceptual model of admiration that highlights admiration’s function for approaching and emulating successful models, thus contributing to social learning at the interpersonal level and to cultural transmission at the group and societal level. (shrink)

Gordon Kaufman's theology is characterized by a heightened tension between transcendence, expressed as theocentrism, and immanence, expressed as theological naturalism. The interplay between these two motifs leads to a contradiction between an austerity created by the conjunction of naturalism and theocentrism, on the one hand, and a humanized cosmos which is characterized by a pivotal and unique role for human moral agency, on the other. This paper tracks some of the influences behind Kaufman's program (primarily H. Richard Niebuhr and (...) Henry Nelson Wieman) and then utilizes the flat ontology that emerges in the work of philosopher/sociologist of science Bruno Latour and of environmental philosopher Timothy Morton in order to point toward a reconstructed immanent theocentrism that no longer stakes meaning and value on the unique place of the human. Such a theology remains theocentric, but is now fully ecological. (shrink)

This paper begins with an exposition of the model of work rooted in Catholic social teaching and goes on to establish that it is through our work that we become the person who we potentially can be. The author upholds the servant leadership model advocated by Robert K. Greenleaf as an antidote to the dysfunctional trends in American life and business characterized by rampant individualism. While focusing its approach on the education of business students the paper presents two critical (...) ideas from the underlying theology of Catholic social teaching—the concept of person and that of a universal call to holiness. Courage, moderation, justice, charity; science, knowledge and wisdom; and competence and prudence are highlighted as the elements of education for true leadership. Finally, the author underlines the increasing importance of understanding contextual and environmental issues relating to business which ought to provide a framework and conceptual foundation for an education that is much more than a set of tools and techniques. (shrink)

Early last year, the GenEthics Consortium (GEC) of the Washington Metropolitan Area convened at George Washington University to consider a complex case about genetic testing for Alzheimer disease (AD). The GEC consists of scientists, bioethicists, lawyers, genetic counselors, and consumers from a variety of institutions and affiliations. Four of the 8 co-authors of this paper delivered presentations on the case. Supplemented by additional ethical and legal observations, these presentations form the basis for the following discussion.

"In his earlier volume, Tradition and Authenticity in the Search for Ecumenic Wisdom, Thomas Langan explored the distinctive kinds of truth handed on by explicit traditions and raised the question of integrating these many diverse truth claims into a responsible, meaningful vision of reality. In Being and Truth, the author lays a foundation for this concept: a theory of knowledge and a theory of being that can find a place for all these differing realities. Although experience is always (...) interpreted in the light of our traditions, Being and Truth shows that this does not preclude real access to persons, things, and their interrelationships." "Balancing the realities of subjectivism with the demands of objective form and structure, giving both the relatively permanent and the ephemeral their due, is at every moment delicate. The "common sense" at the core of each person's "natural faith" must serve as a guide - yet neither of these is a simple notion. Langan unabashedly calls on his own wide-ranging experience of the lived world to illustrate this dialectic. Students and scholars of political philosophy, intellectual history, and theology will benefit from this rich and insightful text, which integrates historicity without undermining the possibility of attaining lasting truth."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

In this article, the focus is on developing a governance concept built on integrating the ISO 26000 Social Responsibility standard with an “employee social responsibility” concept developed by the authors. To this end. The authors propose to compliment the voluntary, organizationally adaptable, ISO 26000 SR standard for the organization/firm with a seamlessly integrated—and equally adaptable—ESR concept for the individual/employee of that organization/firm. An SR/ESR governance concept emerges, with an emphasis on implementing a SR-based business enterprise code of conduct and ESR-related (...) functional-level codes of conduct, the latter firmly ensconced in an organization's ethical climate. The conclusion section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of our proposed SR/ESR governance concept. (shrink)

Since the onset of the latest United States (U.S.) recession (beginning in December 2007), the U.S. economy has been posting high unemployment levels consistently exceeding 8 percent. Of specific interest, the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), reports on a specific subset of the U.S. unemployed: the long‐term unemployed, defined as those who are unemployed for 27 weeks and over. Since December 2009, the share of the long‐term unemployed of the total U.S. unemployed has exceeded 40 percent (...) (through April 2012), the highest level since 1948 when data was first collected. A phenomenon of this recession is an alleged public bias by American private sector employers against hiring the long‐term unemployed, or even simply those unemployed. While the authors support the removal of discrimination against the unemployed in job advertisements, they cannot support the larger notion of including those who are unemployed as a protected class of employees. Becoming or being unemployed is a state that one can change, and based on the lack of research on how widespread this discrimination is (beyond anecdotal stories or limited research surveys), they believe that extending protection under equal employment opportunity legislation would be overreaching and inappropriate at this time. (shrink)

Catholic ethicists assess the development, reception, and relevance of Cardinal Joseph Bernardin's writings on the consistent ethic of life. The late Archbishop of Chicago, Joseph Bernardin, is best remembered for his "seamless garment" approach linking abortion, capital punishment, war, and social justice - and bringing insights from the New Testament and Catholic tradition to bear on the burning issues of our age. Book jacket.

This paper addresses the importance of words and of surrendering words, and so will consider both the philosophical and axiological potential of ineffability, both of which imply epistemic humility. On the one hand, epistemic humility implicates surrendering ill-fitting and limited constructs; this reflects a project of unknowing, a condition for a more authentic knowing, driven less by rigid categories and argument and more by humility and love. On the other hand, epistemic humility—as an observable phenomenon in the world’s (...) religious traditions—has axiological value and thus should be cultivated: it subverts an arrogant knowing which too often is the seed of destructive conflict. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Impact of Clinicians on the Diagnostic ManualThomas A. Widiger (bio)Keywordsdiagnosis, classification, DSM, taxonomy, clinical judgmentSurveys of clinicians’ opinions can be very informative. There is a long tradition within medicine that new disorders are discovered within clinical practice. The original edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) diagnostic manual (DSM) was based in large part on clinical experience. The recent editions have been governed more heavily by more systematic (...) research (Widiger and Clark 2000), but many of the new additions are still said to come from clinical practice. As described for the development of DSM-III (APA 1980), “if there is general agreement among clinicians, who would be expected to encounter the condition, that there are a significant number of patients who have it and that its identification is important in their clinical work, it is included in the classification” (Spitzer, Sheehy, and Endicott 1977, 3).Clinicians can also be surveyed with regard to their opinions concerning a proposed revision. The ultimate consumers of a diagnostic manual are practicing clinicians and any effort to develop an official nomenclature should consider the opinions of the persons who must use the classification within their clinical practice (First et al. 2004; Sadler 2005). Clinicians can also be surveyed (or studied) with respect to how the diagnostic manual is being implemented. Much of this research has demonstrated that clinicians might be failing to apply the diagnostic manual in a reliable or valid manner (Garb 2005; Kutchins and Kirk 1997).It is perhaps obvious, however, that a diagnostic manual should not be governed primarily by clinical opinion or current clinical practice. The authors of DSM-III (APA 1980) and DSM-III-R (APA 1987) indicated that they would include a new diagnosis within the official nomenclature if a group of clinicians indicated that it was important to their clinical practice (Spitzer et al. 1977). This liberal threshold led to the decision of the DSM-III-R Task Force to include such diagnoses as paraphiliac rapism, self-defeating personality disorder, and sadistic personality disorder despite the lack of systematic research supporting their validity and the likelihood that these new diagnoses would have harmful social and forensic applications (Widiger 1995). These diagnoses no longer even appear within the appendix of DSM-IV-TR (APA 2000) for proposed diagnoses needing further study.The authors of DSM-III avoided opinion surveys because “no one wanted to repeat the scene of the general membership voting on a presumably ‘scientific’ issue, as was done in 1973 on the [End Page 277] issue of the elimination of homosexuality from the DSM-II classification” (Spitzer, Williams, and Skodol 1980, 152). Matters of construct validity should probably be addressed through systematic research rather than through opinion polls. Decisions should be informed by a fair hearing of the diversity of perspectives, and these viewpoints and perspectives should be systematically and enthusiastically solicited. Nevertheless, the most scientifically valid decision may at times be “politically incorrect.” The authors of the diagnostic manual should have the authority to make innovative decisions that are scientifically justified even when they are contrary to general clinical consensus (Widiger and Clark 2000).Some persons, though, do suggest that the diagnostic manual should be modeled on how disorders are being diagnosed within clinical practice. This is perhaps most readily evident in the proposals of Westen and Shedler (2000) to diagnose mental disorders via prototypal matching. They eschew the provision of specific and explicit criterion sets in favor of simply matching the patient to a global (e.g., paragraph description) of a prototypic case. A purported strength of this approach is that it is said to “conform to the way clinicians think about psychiatric diagnoses” (First and Westen 2007, 473).There are, however, concerns with respect to prototypal matching. First, it is not really clear that clinicians actually provide diagnoses in this manner. There are data to suggest that clinicians instead reach a diagnostic decision on the basis of just one or two individual diagnostic criteria rather than matching to a global prototype (Herkov and Blashfield 1995).More important, it is unclear whether the diagnostic manual should in fact emulate what is occurring within clinical practice. There is a... (shrink)

Economic methodology has been dominated by developments in the philosophy of science. This book's central thesis is that a great deal can be gained by refocusing attention on developments in the philosophy of mathematics, in particular those that took place over the course of the twentieth century. In this book the authors argue that a close examination of the major developments in the philosophy of mathematics both deepens and enriches our understanding of the formalisation of economics, while also offering novel (...) methods of critically evaluating the strengths and limitations of formalism in economics. This book represents an innovative attempt to more fully understand the complexity of the interaction between developments in the philosophy of mathematics and the process of formalisation in economics. (shrink)

In this article the author submits as thesis that Habermas's concept of communicative action results from an uncritical appropriation of the concept ‘speech act’. For this purpose, firstly the origin of Habermas's idea of a ‘power-free communication’ in his discussion with Gadamer will be considered. The legitimacy of such a concept of language is — following Habermas — adequately shown most of all by Searle. Secondly therefore, Searle's theory of the speech act will be taken in consideration. Indeed, Searle (...) places the speech act at the heart of any adequate study of the language: in the speech act a trouble-free semantic transport takes place. But, as the author claims, two very disputable presuppositions lie at the root of the concept of ‘speech act’. These are: on the one hand the distinction between illocution and perlocution and on the other hand the principle of expressibility. With reference to Grice and Derrida the disputability of these presuppositions is shown. However, Searle uses these principles mainly in a methodological sense in order to constitute the object of ‘speech act’. Finally, Habermas's ontological use of these principles in his theory of communicative action is shown. If one, however, does not accept these — and this article finds that there are good reasons for not doing so —, the crucial distinction between communicative and strategic action breaks down. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 195-198 [Access article in PDF] Implicit and Explicit Temporality Thomas Fuchs Keywords implicit/explicit temporality, embodiment, intersubjectivity, desynchronization, melancholia, schizophrenia Since Minkowski (1970), Strauss (1966), v. Gebsattel (1954), and Tellenbach (1980), temporality has been a main subject of phenomenological psychiatry. Drawing on philosophical concepts of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, these authors have analyzed psychopathologic deviations of time experience, mainly from an individual point (...) of view, for example, as a slowing down or inhibition of lived time in depression or obsessive–compulsive disorder. Their analyses are still most valuable today, but may be carried further by introducing concepts such as embodied and intersubjective temporality into psychopathology. Martin Wyllie (2005), by opening up a wide scope of temporal phenomena and related concepts, makes a laudable effort to contribute to such a progress.In my commentary, I would like to propose a distinction that is suggested by much of Wyllie's analysis and may shed further light on psychopathology, namely between implicit and explicit temporality. If we look at a child while obliviously playing with his toys, lost to the world, we may assume that there is no sense of the time passing. Lived time runs with the movement of life, implicit in the child's experience of being engaged in his play and directed toward his goals. It "unfolds through the processes of bodily activity" (Wyllie 2005). Future and past do not stand out against the pure presence of "becoming." This implicit mode of temporality is retrieved every time that we are absorbed in what we are doing, and may even reach the climax of "flow experiences" (Csikszentmihalyi 1988) where the sense of time is lost in unimpeded, fluent performance.However, this changes when a gap arises between need and satisfaction, desire and fulfillment, or plan and execution. Now the future appears as a "not yet" or "yet to come," experienced as the temporality of awaiting, striving, or longing for. Time is felt as passing by and refusing the desired fulfillment; it becomes conscious or explicit. A similar gap arises between the present and something irretrievably lost, bringing the past to consciousness as a "no more." Again time is experienced explicitly, but now as moving on relentlessly and separating us from the lost object. The gap to the past may not be bridged any more: this is the temporality of missing or mourning. In both cases, explicit time arises as a negation of implicit or lived time (here my use of the term is a bit divergent from Wyllie's); it is experienced as a "not yet" or "no more," often with a component of displeasure or suffering (Fuchs 2001a, 2003)."Implicit" versus "explicit time" thus come near to another distinction well known in phenomenology, namely between the "lived" and [End Page 195] the "corporal body" (Leib versus Koerper). The first term refers to the body functioning in the tacit mode, as the medium of everyday performance. The second term points to the body as turning into the object of attention, for example, when it puts up resistance to our purposes, or is used as an instrument deliberately (Fuchs 2001b). In fact, implicit temporality and tacit performance of the body are nearly synonymous: Lived time may be regarded as a function of the lived body, opened up by its potentiality and capability. The more we are engaged in our tasks, the more we forget time as well as the body; we are, as it were, "inside time." On the other hand, in explicit temporality the body often appears in the corporal or explicit mode as well. For example, when falling ill, we experience our body no more as a tacit medium but rather as an object or obstacle, while we notice the slowing down of time and may even feel excluded from the movement of life. Thus, embodiment and temporality have a parallel background–foreground structure.I now try to carry these considerations further by including the intersubjective dimension of time. In an earlier paper, I describe the attunement of the living being to its environment as a continuous synchronization on the biological as... (shrink)

In the past few decades, a growing number of philosophers have tried to explain the phenomenon of imaginative resistance, or why readers often resist the invitation of authors to imagine morally deviant fictional scenarios. In this paper, I critically assess a recent proposal to explain IR in terms of a failure of empathy, and present a novel explanation. I do so by drawing on Peter Goldie’s narrative account of empathic perspective-taking, which curiously has so far been neglected in the IR-literature. (...) I argue that, in some cases, IR is due to a partial confusion of two kinds of imaginative perspective-taking towards a fictional character: an internal, genuinely empathic, perspective-taking, on the one hand, and an external, crypto-empathic, stance that can be characterized as in-her-shoes-imagining, on the other. I argue that, in the cases at issue, IR is not so much a resistance to imagining but, rather, to empathically enacting an evildoer’s moral and phenomenal first-person perspective. I conclude by considering some more general lessons that follow from my account for what has recently been called sadistic empathy and point to an unresolved issue for future thinking about IR. (shrink)

A longitudinal survey of business graduates over a four-year period revealed stability over time in their assessments of proposals to improve business ethics except for significantly greater disapproval of government regulation. A comparison of graduates and executives indicate both favor developing general ethical business principles, business ethics courses, and codes of ethics, while disapproving government regulation and participation by religious leaders in ethical norms for business. The mean rankings by business graduates over time of factors influencing ethical conduct show significant (...) declines in school-university training and significant increases for religious training and industry practices. Graduates and executives rank family training as the most important influence and school-university training as least important. The authors conclude that a more careful consideration be given to matching reform proposals and influence factors, and to increasing the depth of change efforts in individual business ethics. (shrink)

Fritz Allhoff: Philosophies of the Sciences: A Guide Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 319-325 DOI 10.1007/s10441-011-9129-x Authors Thomas A. C. Reydon, Institute of Philosophy & Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science (ZEWW), Leibniz Universität Hannover, Im Moore 21, 30161 Hannover, Germany Journal Acta Biotheoretica Online ISSN 1572-8358 Print ISSN 0001-5342 Journal Volume Volume 59 Journal Issue Volume 59, Numbers 3-4.

Roger Sansom and Robert N. Brandon (eds.): Integrating Evolution and Development: From Theory to Practice Content Type Journal Article Pages 81-86 DOI 10.1007/s10441-010-9121-x Authors Thomas A. C. Reydon, Institute of Philosophy & Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science (ZEWW), Leibniz Universität Hannover, Im Moore 21, 30167 Hannover, Germany Journal Acta Biotheoretica Online ISSN 1572-8358 Print ISSN 0001-5342 Journal Volume Volume 59 Journal Issue Volume 59, Number 1.

The PRIME Institute of the College of Pharmacy, University of Minnesota, recently released preliminary research findings indicating a trend of extraordinary pharmaceutical industry pricing of drug products in the United States (U.S.). According to researchers at the PRIME Institute, such extraordinary price increases are defined as any price increase that is equal to, or greater than, 100% at a single point in time. In some instances, PRIME Institute researchers found that drugs exhibiting extraordinary price increases are categorized as "orphan drugs" (...) (or blood-related biologic treatments) and often life-saving or life-sustaining for treating the cause or symptoms of diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 people in the U.S., or where there is prevalence of less than 5 per 10,000 people afflicted with a disease or symptoms in the community. Because of extraordinary price increases for orphan drugs — some exceeding 1000% at a single point in time -this article addresses two interrelated questions: Are extraordinary orphan drug price increases socially responsible behavior? If so, are the pharmaceutical industry's policies providing orphan drug access to American consumers in dire need of available life-sustaining and life-enhancing pharmaceuticals considered "socially responsible" behavior? The author concludes, after an interdisciplinary analysis of the legal, economic, sociopolitical, and ethical dimensions of orphan drug pricing, that they are not socially responsible – unless justified by cost and availability of health care marketplace/patient options. Furthermore, the author recommends a socially responsible industry strategic approach to insure that patients ultimately receive -regardless of cost -timely access to life-saving and life-sustaining orphan drugs. (shrink)

This monograph is a systematic defence of the views of key figures in the 18th-century sentimentalist tradition. It aims to explain, to borrow Thomas Nagel's phrase, the very possibility of altruism in a way that engages with contemporary meta-ethics. The details of the account are primarily taken from the work of Francis Hutcheson, although the work of Shaftesbury also receives extended consideration. The author argues that the basis of our admiration for disinterested altruism is simply an innate human (...) instinct, an ‘affective sensitivity’ that is distinct from our capacity to reason. We instinctively seek our own happiness and instinctively approve of the disinterested altruism displayed by others. This affective sensitivity is distinctively valuable, essential for motivation and a crucial element in the justification of altruism. Filonowicz's defence of his central thesis is interleaved with his readings of the historical works that constitute, in his words, the ‘short and rather melancholic’ history of the sentimentalist school .The key philosophical question is what a Hutchesonian moral sense is supposed to be. The Hutchesonian conception seems an unhappy hybrid …. (shrink)

The present paper deals with eight charges that are frequently leveled against any research that focuses on the agrapha dogmata. The charges are demonstrated to be completely unfounded and, therefore, duly dismissed. In particular, it is argued here that the phrase ta legomena is by no means to be understood as ironic. Consequently, the article rejects the very common picture of Plato as some sort of dogmatist and author of a fixed philosophical system. However, Plato’s philosophy is presented as (...) rather ‘overt’ and ‘straightforward’ in its nature. With the situation being as it is, thorough knowledge of the agrapha dogmata is shown to be an absolute prerequisite for understanding Plato’s dialogues. The paper concludes with an observation that while investigating the issue is completely warranted and does not in any way entail any devaluation of the dialogues, Aristotle’s testimony must also be taken into account. (shrink)

By “the Enlightenment Project” the author means “the attempt to define and explain the human predicament through science as well as to achieve mastery over it through the use of a social technology”. One immediately wonders if this definition of “the Enlightenment Project” is radical enough. The author intends to join the many critics of the Enlightenment. Most of these think the Enlightenment got science wrong as well as much else. Twentieth century scientists do not adhere to the (...) methods put forward by Descartes, Bacon, even Newton, and the positivists. On this, the critics say, the scientists have been right, the Enlightenment wrong. The fatal flaw of the Enlightenment Project was not in science, but in an assumption held prior to science—namely, that scientific and all other knowledge must adhere to a canon of strict deductive/reductive demonstrability. Capaldi joins other critics in attacking this fatal flaw. He argues further, however, that science is also flawed in that it purports to provide “explanations,”. He claims that such explanations, the descriptions of underlying causal mechanisms, offer us “no way to decide among them”. Yet this last point is true only under the canon of deductive/reductive demonstrability, which, it seems, Capaldi would eschew. (shrink)

This essay is an informal examination of the efforts made by mathematical logicians from Russell on, to evade the paradoxes revealed by uncritical methods of definition and predication. Where systems are described it is with a minimum of formal apparatus, so that the climate is one of rather vague statement and imprecise question. Russell’s drastic banning of type–offending formulas gives the starting–point for queries about the connection of sense and formalism, and the conclusion may be summed up as the detection (...) of a contrast between mechanisation and sensefulness which is seen as constituting a line of tension, as it were a geological weakness in formal structures, which permits the insertion of a philosophic wedge. Interesting as such an idea is, it is not clear between what regions this line has been drawn. On the one hand the undecidability results of Gödel show that formal methods can be extended indefinitely beyond the scope of what is mechanisable; on the other the author methodically refrains from defining what he means by ‘sense’. In so far as he explicitly leaves his meaning on this point to be gathered form his treatment of non–sense, and the paradoxes are here taken as representative of the latter, we might suppose that he is equating sense with consistency. For expressions leading to paradox were only ruled senseless by Russell because they lead to inconsistency. But it is fairly clear that something more epistemologically interesting is intended, since the author dismisses from consideration ‘la déductivité structurale, sens immédiat d’une vaste architecture symbolique d’abord vide, et intégralement traduisible en syntaxe’. Such translatability has, incidentally, its limits, as Gödel’s results again show, and it is our belief that the discussion might have been put in a more exact and workmanlike frame if the list of works consulted had contained more than one, and that a relatively minor, publication of Gödel. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nietzsche’s Reading and Private Library, 1885–1889Thomas H. BrobjerOne can easily get the impression that Nietzsche read little, especially later in his life. He criticizes reading because it is not sufficiently life-affirming and Dionysian: “Early in the morning at the break of day, in all the freshness and dawn of one’s strength, to read a book—I call that vicious!...” 1 He also criticizes it for making one reactive and forcing (...) one to be concerned with the thoughts of others rather than with one’s own:My eyes alone put an end to all bookwormishness, in plain terms philology: I was redeemed from the “book,” for years I read nothing—the greatest favour I have ever done myself!—That deepest self, as it were buried and grown silent under a constant compulsion to listen to other selves (—and that is what reading means!) awoke slowly, timidly, doubtfully—but at length it spoke again. 2This impression is strengthened by the fact that in his published books from 1885–88 very few contemporary and minor authors and books are mentioned. [End Page 663] He also explicitly claims that he read little: “It does not perhaps lie in my nature to read much or many kinds of things: a reading room makes me ill.... Caution, even towards new books is rather part of my instinct.” 3 Concretely, he claims in Ecce Homo that, “I have to reckon back half a year to catch myself with a book in my hand. But what was it?—An excellent study by Victor Brochard, les Sceptiques Grecs.” 4 As suggested in a quotation above, and as a major leitmotif in his letters, his health and especially that of his eyes is another reason to assume that he read little. This is also how most philosophers and historians have tended to treat Nietzsche—as an isolated, profound thinker.However, this impression and Nietzsche’s claims here are to a large extent incorrect. Nietzsche was, in fact, a rather substantial reader. This is true not only for his younger days but also for his last four active years, 1885–88. 5 Contrary to his claim that he is hostile to new books, he was very pleased with the large trilingual bookshop Löscher in Turin. He was a frequent and good enough customer to know its “Chef “ and to make contacts through it. 6 Nietzsche frequently used other bookshops, ordered book catalogues, and asked for recommendations of new book titles. 7 Nietzsche found some of the most important books in his life as random discoveries in bookshops, for example, those of Schopenhauer, Stendhal, and Dostoyevsky. Contrary to his claim that a reading room made him ill, he praised Turin for its good libraries, 8 and he wrote to his sister: “one cannot even with ten horses draw me to a place where, if I am correctly informed, not even a good library is to be found.” 9 Libraries were [End Page 664] important for Nietzsche’s reading, and the quality of the libraries was an important determining factor in deciding Nietzsche’s travels and places of residence. He even occasionally wrote to libraries to inquire if they were suitable for his purposes and for deciding if he would visit the town. 10 During the period 1885–88 Nietzsche used the libraries in Nice, Leipzig, Chur, Venice, Turin, and the Hotel Alpenrosen’s library in Sils-Maria. He probably also used the library in Zürich and possibly in other towns, and he planned to visit Stuttgart for the sake of its library.Nietzsche did not have a permanent address during the period discussed in this article and hence travelled frequently. But travelling was difficult for him and almost without exception made him ill, and it was more difficult still with a heavy load of books. During these years Nietzsche lived on a low pension from the University of Basel and constantly worried about his expenses. In spite of this he bought a not insignificant number of books. His private library today contains 60 books published from 1885 to 1888 and in 23 of these Nietzsche has made markings, often extensively, and from several... (shrink)

Since the mid-1980s, internal corporate investigations have become commonplace in the U. S., with an upsurge occurring as a result of the corporate scandals of 2001-02 involving Adelphi Communications Corporation, Enron, Merck & Company, Riggs Bank, and other companies accused of financial malfeasance. After an introduction, this article first presents the U. S. public policy framework (as implemented through the U. S. Sentencing Commission, the U. S. Department of Justice, and the Securities and Exchange Commission) encouraging the use of corporate (...) internal investigations and self-reporting of these results to federal authorities; second, evaluates this framework, identifying the public policy issues inhibiting companies from using corporate internal investigations and self-reporting significant results; third, proposes a policy incentive regime which attempts to ameliorate these outstanding issues; and fourth, offer policy recommendations and suggestions for further research on this topic, including increasing the maximum deduction in the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Culpability Score available to a firm for development of an Effective Compliance and Ethics Program (from 3 to 5 points), and self-reporting the results of an internal investigation (from 5 to 7 points); evaluating the effectiveness of these enhancements in legal incentives over a period of 5-7 years after implementation; instituting a formal federal government effort to educate the American business community on the corporate reputation (and financial) benefits of an effective compliance program; and protecting attorney-client privilege and work product protection, through legislative action, to encourage company executives and directors to utilize independent, outside attorneys to conduct fair, comprehensive, and impartial internal investigations. (shrink)

This essay deals with conditions, challenges and perspectives concerning the legal system of the European Union after the Lisbon treaty has entered into force. It starts out by recalling constitutional principles such as primacy, direct effect and consistent interpretation of the European legal order on the one hand and the relationship of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts – notably pointing out the importance of the preliminary procedure (Article 267 TFEU) – on the other hand. (...) In addition, characteristics of the legal system of the European Union such as the integration of national legal systems are highlighted. It is accentuated that the legal community of the European Union depends on the acceptance by all 27 Member States. Furthermore, the normative quality of European law-making is discussed as well as the necessity for a sufficient democratic legitimation of European Law. As impressively illustrated by the financial crisis, the European Union is much better equipped with possibilities to effectively fulfil regulatory tasks than any Member State. The author shows developments with regard to European Union citizenship, non-discrimination, the Charter of Fundamental Rights - that is now equipped with binding character – and the vertical distribution of competences between the European Union and the Member States, including explanations relating to subsidiarity requirements and their judicial review. Moreover, challenges to the institutions of the European Union are discussed. (shrink)

A number of authors have recently argued that the mathematical insights of "chaos theory" offer a promising formal model or significant analogy for understanding at least some historical events. We examine a representative claim of each kind regarding the application of chaos theory to problems of historical explanation. We identify two lines of argument. One we term the Causal Thesis, which states that chaos theory may be used to plausibly model, and so explain, historical events. The other we term the (...) Convergence Thesis, which holds that, once the analogy between history and chaos theory is properly appreciated, any temptation to divide history from the rest of science should be greatly lessened. We argue that the proffered analogy between chaos theory and history falls apart upon closer analysis. The promised benefits of chaos theory vis-à-vis history are either fantastic or, at best, an extremely loose heuristic which, while retaining nothing of the considerable intrinsic interest of nonlinear dynamics, easily seduces the unwary into taking at face value terms and concepts that have a specifically precise meaning only within the confines of mathematical theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.1 (2002) 63-82 [Access article in PDF] Faith, Philosophy, and the Nominalist Background to Luther's Defense of the Real Presence Thomas Osborne Recent scholarship has brought into question the traditional interpretation of Luther as being hostile towards philosophy. 1 Graham White claims that Luther holds a place in the history of logic as a member of the Nominalist tradition. 2 Bruce D. (...) Marshall argues that Luther and Thomas Aquinas fundamentally agree on the relationship between faith and reason. 3 Both scholars recognize that Luther himself stressed the importance of logic and used late medieval philosophical techniques. Although I agree with this scholarship that Luther's thought must not be understood in isolation from late medieval thought, I will argue that Luther uses philosophical ideas in a way which conflicts with that of the scholastic tradition. The focus here is on Luther's understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in the context of Luther's controversy over the Eucharist with the Swiss sacramentarians, among whom Zwingli and Oecolampadius were the most prominent. 4 Although Luther uses philosophical [End Page 63] distinctions to argue against what he thinks are misinterpretations of the Bible, he does not in any explicit and systematic way use philosophy to arrive at a theological understanding of the Eucharist. Luther differs from his scholastic predecessors in that he uses philosophy not to develop theological conclusions but only to attack errors about the Bible, and so the concern here is with Luther's use of Nominalist doctrines about presence in his attack on the sacra-mentarians' belief that Christ cannot be present both at the right hand of God and in the Eucharist at the same time.In his discussion of the Eucharistic doctrine which is presented in The Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), Luther not only argues against the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharistic sacrifice but also against transubstantiation. 5 Luther explicitly states that he was influenced on this issue by Peter D'Ailly, a Nominalist follower of William of Ockham. D'Ailly and other Nominalists thought that transubstantiation was not the only possible way that Christ could be present in the Eucharist, since if God wished he could also make Christ present along with the substance of the bread and wine. 6 From a Nominalist [End Page 64] perspective transubstantiation requires two actions of God, namely, the annihilation of the substance of the bread and the placement of Christ's body under the species. Therefore, consubstantiation would be a simpler account of Christ's Eucharistic presence. If Christ's body were present along with the substance of the bread annihilation would not have to occur. But D'Ailly and the Nominalists argue that we know from Church authority that the real presence occurs through transubstantiation. On this issue the Nominalists differ from Thomas Aquinas, who gives philosophically-based arguments against consubstantiation. 7 When Luther attacks Thomas, he attacks not so much the use of philosophy in theology as Thomas's philosophy: "But this opinion of Thomas hangs so completely in the air without support of Scripture or reason that it seems to me he knows neither his philosophy nor his dialectic." 8Since the Nominalist belief in transubstantiation rather than consubstantiation rests on an acceptance of Church authority, the rejection of such authority would seem to lead to a rejection of transubstantiation. If Luther had assented to traditional Nominalist theology with the sole exception of its reliance on Church authority, one would expect him to argue for the necessity of consubstantiation. However, Luther sees himself as rejecting an unnecessarily philosophical theology in a return to a more biblical faith. 9 Luther claims that he argues for a particular understanding of the Eucharistic presence but rather "that every one may feel at liberty to ponder, hold, and believe either one view or the other without endangering his salvation." 10 Although Luther's training in Nominalist theology leads him to think that consubstantiation is possible, he at no point argues that a belief... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jacob Burckhardt, Religion, and the Historiography of “Crisis” and “Transition”Thomas Albert Howard*A great historical subject, the representation of which should be the high point of a historian’s life, must cohere sympathetically and mysteriously to the author’s innermost being.Jacob Burckhardt 1If you are to venture to interpret the past you can do so only out of the fullest exertion of the vigor of the present: only when you (...) can put forth your... qualities in all their strength will you divine what is worth knowing and preserving in the past.Friedrich Nietzsche 2The renowned nineteenth-century Swiss-German historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97) was a masterful historian of crises and transitional periods. Two of his major works, The Age of Constantine the Great (1852) and The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860), bear out this claim. In his Constantine Burckhardt deals with the transition from late pagan antiquity to the early Christian Middle Ages, and in his more famous Renaissance he deals with the transition from the late Middle Ages to the beginnings of secular modernity. In the [End Page 149] latter, as is well known, he established one of the most compelling and creative theses in the history of modern historiography, virtually creating the “idea of the Renaissance” that has long influenced both scholarly and popular conceptions of that period. 3What elicited Burckhardt’s interest in crises and transitions in general and in these two periods of crisis and transition in particular? In this article, I shall argue that there is a strong relationship between Burckhardt’s own historical experience in the early and mid-nineteenth century and his choice of subject and mode of analysis in these two monumental works. In theoretical terms one observes a “dialectical” form of objectivity in the execution of Burckhardt’s historiographical tasks: a structural affinity or kinship between subject (Burckhardt, his historical experience) and object (late antiquity, Renaissance) predisposes Burckhardt to his theme/argument and thus provides a key to understanding the genesis and the character of insights that he offers in these two works. 4 To establish this point I shall focus on the category of religion, on Burckhardt’s own experience of questions of religious truth and skepticism in the nineteenth century, and on his treatment of religion in these two works.The Young Jacob Burckhardt and ReligionReligion is a crucial but often neglected aspect of Jacob Burckhardt’s thought. 5 Like a number of nineteenth-century German intellectuals, Burckhardt was a Pfarrersohn, a “pastor’s son.” 6 He grew up in a profoundly conservative Protestant environment in Basel, nicknamed “pious Basel” for its dogged resistance to the “ideas of 1789” and for its earlier heritage of Reformation and pietist religiosity. During Burckhardt’s youth in fact, his father was a children’s minister and head-deacon (Obersthelfer) before becoming in 1838 the city cathedral’s Antistes, the highest and most prestigious ecclesiastical office in Basel. In short, as his biographer Werner Kaegi has noted, Burckhardt’s early [End Page 150] upbringing and education were strongly shaped by the world of his father, a world of “old Protestant piety.” 7Following his father’s example, Burckhardt started out on the clerical track, studying theology at the University of Basel. However, during his Theologie-studium (1837–39) he experienced a profound crisis of faith brought on by an encounter with German historical biblical criticism and liberal theology represented in the person of W. M. L. de Wette (1780–1848). A radical theologian and biblical scholar, de Wette had wound up in Basel in 1822 after being dismissed from the University of Berlin for holding views considered heterodox and politically threatening by the conservative Prussian government. 8 In a letter to his friend Johannes Riggenbach written in August 1838 Burckhardt tells how de Wette’s critical theology had unseated his faith. “In my eyes,” Burckhardt wrote,de Wette’s system grows in stature every day; one simply must follow him, there is no alternative; but every day a part of our traditional church doctrine melts away under his hand. Today, finally, I realized that he regards the birth of Christ simply as a myth... (shrink)

Richard Moran’s Authority and Estrangement develops a compelling explanation of the characteristic features of self-knowledge that involve the use of ‘I’ as subject. Such knowledge is immediate in the sense of non-inferential, is not evidentially grounded and is epistemically authoritative.1 A&E develops its distinctive explanation while also offering accounts of other features of self-knowledge that are often overlooked, such as the centrality of self-knowledge characterised in this way to the concept of the person and its ethical importance. Moran recognises that (...) were an agent to lack the capacity authoritatively to avow his or her own state of mind this would be an ethically damaging defect. Moran’s treatment of these issues is subtle and in places profoundly insightful. I will argue, however, that there is a loose fit between two separate explanations that he gives of self-knowledge. On the one hand Moran argues that the best explanation of self-. (shrink)

This is the third in a series dealing with the concept of self and its importance in understanding Chinese, Japanese, and Indian cultures. The authors examine the relationship between self and image and its significance in attaining a deeper knowledge of Chinese, Japanese, and Indian cultures. The relationship between self and image is as complex as it is fascinating. It takes on different meanings and significances in diverse cultures. In this volume, the focus of attention is largely on representational practices (...) and symbolic media, such as literature, cinema, art, and dance. By examining both classical and contemporary works associated with China, India, and Japan, the authors seek, on the one hand, to demonstrate the intricate relationship between self and image and, on the other, to make use of that relationship to further our understanding of these cultures. (shrink)